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The Responsibility to Protect IDPs in Africa 
 
This paper explores the responsibility to protect (R2P) as an organizing concept for 
preventing, addressing and finding durable solutions to internal displacement in Africa. Whilst 
the most innovative norms for protecting the forcibly displaced have been conceptualized in 
Africa, they have not durably addressed displacement due to limitation in implementation. 
R2P has similarly faced criticisms emanating from lack of clarity and distrust.  Restated norms 
underlying Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) frameworks and R2P complement each other, 
and can be simultaneously operationalized, through a more credible regional approach, to 
encourage effective protection of IDPs  in Africa. Pillar one, two and non-coercive elements of 
pillar three of R2P, and its underlying moral principles are explored whilst employing Kenya 
as a case study in the process of seeking to secure state responsibility for the protection of 
displaced civilians victimized by mass atrocities.  
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This article argues for marrying existing and emerging normative and institutional mechanisms related to the 
concepts of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and internal displacement in Africa. It seeks to identify their 
convergency and, or complementarity, and utilises this to set out a conceptual argument for state responsibility, 
within the context of preventing and responding to internal displacement. The Kenyan 2008 post-election 
violence is explored as a pivotal case study on how the convergence of R2P norms and Internally Displaced 
Persons (IDPs) protection mechanisms, can be employed to collectively prevent, or address the plight of the 
internally displaced in Africa. This final section also draws out the limitations and possibilities of such 
approach. First, it highlights the relevance of political interest and the importance and viability of a regional as 
opposed to a purely internationally driven operationalization.  Secondly, it emphasizes the limited replicability 
of this approach, due to its dependence on very particular contextual factors.  
 Engaging R2P within an internal displacement context is not new. 1 However, most scholarly work has 
focused on either one or the other, failing to simultaneously centre them both within a civilian protection 
context. Despite sovereignty as responsibility being recognised as an antecedent to R2P, and IDPs often being 
victims of crimes that fall within the ambit of R2P, the uptake of the R2P norm in IDPs protection has been 
slow.2 Notwithstanding these gaps, the spirit of R2P is reflected in normative and institutional frameworks for 
civilian protection in Africa, including those on internal displacement.3 This best reflects Francis Deng’s work 
 
1 E Mooney “Something Old, Something New, Something Borrowed … Something Blue? The Protection Potential of a Marriage of 
Concepts between R2P and IDP Protection” (2010) 2/1 Global Responsibility to Protect 60 at 63; R Cohen “Reconciling R2P with IDP 
protection” (2010) 2 Global Responsibility to Protect 15  at 20. 
2 Mooney ibid. 
3 The African Union (AU) Constitutive Act, 2001 OAU Doc. CAB/LEG.23.15 adopted by the Thirty-Sixth Ordinary Session of the 





which pioneered both IDPs protection and R2P through the concept of sovereignty as responsibility, eventually 
underpinning the Guiding principles on internal displacement.  
The Guiding principles are the conceptual and legal foundations for a system to protect IDPs.4They 
comprise what has been described as minimum international standards for the treatment of IDPs, by clarifying 
gaps and covering all phases, and causes of internal displacement.5 The IDPs system was contested from the 
outset, but it was eventually agreed that a distinctive regime for their protection was needed.6 IDPs protection 
needs emanating from civil wars, forced relocations and serious human rights abuses required a rethink in 
approaches to sovereignty, humanitarian action and operations.7 Francis Deng, the first United Nations 
Secretary General’s (UNSG) Representative on the Human Rights of IDPs negotiated for a protection system 
that balanced out the above concerns by emphasising the need to re-configurate and re-understand sovereignty, 
not just as a right, but also a duty.8  
 
Sovereignty as responsibility posits primary responsibility for the welfare and safety of IDPs with their 
governments. However, when governments are unable to fulfil their responsibilities, they should request and 
accept offers of aid from the international community. If they refuse or deliberately obstruct access and put large 
numbers at risk, the international community has a right and even a responsibility to take a series of calibrated 
actions. These range from 'diplomatic demarches to political pressures, sanctions, or, as a last resort, military 
intervention.' State failure to provide protection and life-supporting assistance 'legitimized the involvement of the 
international community’.9   
 
The concept of responsibility to protect, first conceptualized as sovereignty as responsibility, assigns the main 
responsibility for welfare and safety of civilians (including IDPs) on their states, in pillar one.10 If unable to 
fulfill their obligations, these states are required to request, be offered and accept support from the community 
of nations, as pillar two prescribes.11 Pillar three dictates that any unwillingness or deliberate obstruction of 
access, resulting in protection or material risks of civilians, including IDPs, is grounds for timeous and decisive 
 
Security Council of the African Union (PSC Protocol), adopted at First Ordinary Session of African Union Assembly 9  July 2002- Durban, 
South Africa, art 7e; The African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala 
Convention), adopted by the Special Summit of the Union, adopted 23 October 2009- Kampala, Uganda, art 8; International Conference on 
the Great Lakes Region, Protocol to the Pact on Security, Stability and Development in the Great Lakes Region on the Protection and 
Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons ( GLR IDP Protocol), adopted 30 November 2006-Nairobi, Kenya; E Luck “Sovereignty, choice 
and the responsibility to Protect” (2009) 1 Global Responsibility to Protect 10 at 15; UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, 1998 
(E.CN.4/1998/53/Add.1) (E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2) principles 3, 25; The Guiding principles reflect a wider ambit of human rights protection 
than the R2P Principle, or Article 4 (h) of the AU Constitutive Act which are limited to mass atrocities; For a disambiguation of the 
relationship between R2P, art 4 (h) and the protection of civilians, see D Kuwali, “Article 4 (h), the responsibility to protect and the 
protection of civilians” in D Kuwali and F Viljoen (ed) By All means Necessary: Protecting Civilians and Preventing Mass Atrocities in 
Africa (2017, PULP) 16 at 24-26. 
4 ‘IDPs’ is not a closed description, but a factual state which triggers legal consequences; Brookings Institution, Protecting Internally 
Displaced Persons: A Manual for Law and Policy Makers (2008, Brookings) at 11. 
5 L Juma “The narrative of vulnerability and deprivation in protection regimes for internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Africa: An 
appraisal of the Kampala Convention” 2012 (16) Law Democracy and Development 219 at 226; Guiding principles introduction, para. (3) 
above note 3; These gaps included consensus, applicability, and ratification gaps; F Deng “The plight of the internally displaced: a challenge 
to the international community” (2004) at 2 available at: http://www.brookings.edu accessed on 12-09-2020. 
6 UNHCR “Internally displaced persons” The State of the World’s Refugees: Human Displacement in the New Millennium (2006, Oxford 
University Press) 153 at 166-167; Cohen above at note 1 at 17; See S Ogata The Turbulent Decade: Confronting the Refugee Crisis of the 
1990s (2005, W.W. Norton & Company) at 38; See also Javier Perez de Cuellar, former UN Secretary general, as quoted in R Cohen and F 
Deng Masses in Flight: The Global Crisis of Internal Displacement (1998, Brookings Institution) at 1. 
7 T Weiss and D Korn Internal Displacement: Conceptualization and its Consequences (2006, Routledge) 11 and 29.  
8 Deng and Cohen above note 6 at 24; F Deng “The impact of state failure on migration” (2004) 15/4 Mediterranean Quarterly 16 at 17; Id 
at 17. 
9 Cohen and Deng id at 7; F Deng Protecting the Dispossessed: A Challenge for the International Community (1993, Brookings Institution) 
at 14-20; Deng et al Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa (1996, Brookings Institution), at 2-19, 27-33. 
10 Protection against mass atrocities such as genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, including ethnic cleansing  





intervention from the international community within the confines of the United Nations Security Council 
(Chapter VII), possibly cascading through to regional organizations.12 Such intervention could range from 
diplomatic efforts, political pressure and sanctions, to military efforts. The legal obligation to protect civilians 
lies with their government as its state responsibility. R2P facilitates owning up to such responsibility. 
Accordingly,  
 
 …the obligation imposed on states by humanitarian and human rights law to refrain from refusing reasonable 
offers of international assistance, makes it difficult to dispute the existence of a duty to accept such offers.13 
 
The reconciliation of these analogous principles of sovereignty and fundamental human rights was 
institutionalised through international norm setting initiatives,14 and eventually reflected in African 
frameworks.15 R2P norms within African Union (AU) frameworks are more than an organizing political 
principle. They generate collective legal obligations for member states of the AU to respond to mass atrocity 
crimes because they are embedded in the AU Constitutive Act, which all its member states have signed.16  
This elevates state obligations for civilian protection and non-discrimination which underpin the AU 
framework.17 It also emphasizes that within the context of the framework, including the AU Convention for the 
Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala Convention), there is outright 
acknowledgement that states take primary, but not exclusive responsibility for protecting and assisting the 
internally displaced.18 This recognizes that in certain cases, states may be unable or unwilling to do so.19 Such 
states are required to request support and cooperate with necessary actors in order to protect and assist IDPs, 
failure of which justifies collective action.20 Such action would be operationalized within the context of article 8 
(1) and (2) of the Convention, which prescribes AU intervention.  
The Convention is largely based on provisions of the Guiding principles, integrating international 
human rights and humanitarian law norms as they relate to internal displacement.  It also incorporates principles 
from African regional instruments such as the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR), and 
the International Conference of the Great Lakes (GLR) IDP Protocol, giving it an African character, in response 
to the unique African context.21 The GLR Process which occasioned the 2006 Pact on Security, Stability and 
 
12 AU Constitutive Act, above at note 3 art 3(f).  
13 Cohen and Deng above at note 6 at 277. 
14 K Annan, Annual Report of the Secretary General to the General Assembly SG/SM/7136 GA/9596 20 September 1999 at 20; 
Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) The Responsibility to Protect (2001, IDRC) at 6; UN 
General Assembly, World Summit Outcome 2005 Resolution A/RES/60/1, 24 October 2005, para. 138-139; UN Resolution 1674 of April 
2006; Resolutions 1261 and 1325 condemning the deliberate targeting of internally displaced children and women and Resolution 1400 
extending the mandate of the United Nations in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) for the protection of IDPs which specifically mentions R2P in 
this context. 
15 A Bellamy “Realizing the responsibility to protect” (2009) 10/2 International Studies Perspective 111 at 122; R Thakur United Nations, 
Peace and Security: From Collective Security to the Responsibility to Protect (2006, Cambridge University Press) at 255; G Evans The 
Responsibility to Protect:Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and For All (2009, Brookings Institution) at 36-38. 
16 Kuwali, above at note 3 at 22, 23; Kampala Convention above note 3 art 4 (h, j). 
17 P Orchard Protecting the Internally Displaced: Rhetoric and Reality (2019, Routledge) at 7; C Beyani “State Responsibility for the 
Prevention and Resolution of Forced Population Displacements in International Law” (1995) 7 International Journal of Refugee Law130 at 
132; Art (9 and 10) of International Law Commission (ILC) Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts 
(2001) Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10); Abebe The Emerging Law of Forced Displacement in Africa: Development and Implementation of the 
Kampala Convention on Internal Displacement (2017, Routledge) at 10; Kampala Convention above at note 3 arts 5(1), 9(1)(a); Guiding 
principles above note 3 principle 3(1). 
18 Kampala Convention id preamble and art 5(1); Guiding principles ibid.  
19 Kampala Convention id arts 5 (2) (3) (6), (7). 
20 Ibid; This happens where there are mass atrocity crimes proven to have been systematic and planned. Not all IDP situations justify R2P 
action. The GLR intervention framework offers wider protection than the AU intervention framework. 
21 M Asplet and M Bradley “The African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa 





Development in the Great Lakes Region (GLR Pact) and IDP protocol, was an intergovernmental process set up 
to address peace, security and development. As a collectively binding norm making platform, accountability 
measures accompanied its framework to ensure adoption, domestication and implementation.22 The GLR has 
taken noteworthy steps in attempting to redress the protracted and cyclic crises of internal displacement. The 
sub-region is also the first in Africa to have done so. Subsequently, lessons from the process and initiatives 
thereof have influenced the AU continent-wide framework on international justice, peace and security, including 
responses to internal displacement.23  
This article highlights that evolving R2P and IDPs regimes within the African context have 
conceptually, legally and morally presented a crucial and distinctive contribution to the development of law in 
this area. It shows that such efforts predate global responses to internal displacement and are influenced by the 
genealogy of African states, which was always conscious of, and highly fraught by the crisis of displacement. 
The article goes beyond existing work in this field by using Kenya as a case study to show how developments of 
both R2P and IDPs regimes have been uniquely elaborated and implemented in Africa to enhance civilian 
protection. Simultaneously, this case study highlights the protection potential, effectiveness and limitations of 
rallying for IDPs protection through R2P. The ‘successful’ invocation of the norm in Kenya is widely 
contested.24 Criticisms focused on the failure to anticipate and prevent the post-election violence, whilst 
overlooking the nuanced responsibility to react and rebuild. This article posits that while prevention is an 
important aspect of protection, including, under certain circumstances, obligating the due diligence of states to 
take all reasonable measures of prevention,25 Kenya teaches us not to overlook other dimensions of R2P short of 
military intervention, when prevention is no longer possible, especially within displacement contexts.   
 
 
CHASTENED SOVEREIGNTY AND COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY IN AFRICA 
 
Reconciling sovereignty with collective responsibility to protect civilians in Africa 
 
Conflict-led mass atrocities in Africa, like in other parts of the world, precipitated the process of reconciling 
sovereignty with the protection of civilians, by committing to collective intervention.26 In some of these 
conflicts, including in Rwanda, African countries were forced to fend for themselves, due to delayed and 
politicized responses from the international community.27 Consequently, the Organisation of African Unity 
 
African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, adopted 27 June 1981, entered into force 21 October 1986, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3, 
rev.5; GLR IDP Protocol above note 3.  
22 These included ensuring IDPs participation in norm domestication;  Regional programmes of action, Regional follow up mechanisms and 
a coordinating committee; D Clancy “Lessons from a State of Flux: The International Justice Laboratory of the Great Lakes Pact” in L Oette 
Criminal Law Reform and Transitional Justice: Human Rights Perspectives for Sudan (2016, Routledge) at 199. 
23 Clancy ibid. 
24 Cohen above at note 1 at 21; S Sharma “The 2007-2008 Post-Election Crisis in Kenya: A success story for the Responsibility to Protect” 
in J Hoffman and A Nollkaemper (ed) Responsibility to Protect: From Principle to Practice (2012, Pallas publication) at 30. 
25 S Rosenberg “Responsibility to Protect: A Framework for Prevention” (2009) 1 Global Responsibility to Protect  442 at 443. 
26 S Dersso “The African Union’s agenda on the protection of civilians: A review of its ambition and practice’ in D Kuwali and F Viljoen 
(eds.) By All means Necessary: Protecting Civilians and Preventing Mass Atrocities in Africa (2017, PULP) at 396; Cases in point: Somalia, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Rwanda. 





(OAU) Summit in Tunis,28 presented an opportunity for the OAU, the AU’s predecessor, to articulate for the 
first time, a system of collective response to prevent, respond to and rebuild after mass atrocities:  
 
[R]wanda stands out as a stern and severe rebuke for all of us for having failed to address Africa’s security 
problems. As a result of that, a terrible slaughter of the innocent has taken place, and is taking place in front of our 
very eyes. We know it is a matter of fact that we must have it in ourselves as Africans to change all this. We must, 
in action assert our will to do so.29 
 
In the years that followed, when Africa’s Peace and Security Architecture was being set up, the above views 
were reiterated by the first AU Commissioner for peace and security: 
 
No more, never again. Africans cannot watch the tragedies developing on the continent and say it is the UN’s 
responsibility or somebody else’s responsibility. We have moved from the concept of non-interference to non-
indifference. We cannot as Africans remain indifferent to the tragedy of our people.30 
 
The acknowledgement of responsibility to protect by African governments has evolved substantially. Sub-
Saharan African states with the exception of Zimbabwe31 were significantly avid supporters of the adoption of 
resolution 167432 which reaffirmed the UN World summit’s provisions on the doctrine of responsibility to 
protect.33 States like Rwanda insisted on the ‘necessity of collective R2P’, whilst Benin ‘signaled its full 
support’ and Tanzania, with some reserve, endorsed R2P insisting that ‘when governments fail or are unable to 
offer such protection, we should have a collective responsibility to protect humanity’.34 A similar view was 
shared by South Africa, Ghana, and Republic of Congo.35The above approach has resulted in a strong civilian 
protection agenda, including frameworks set up to address internal displacement in Africa.  
 
 
Normative and institutional aspects of collective responsibility in Africa 
 
Starting with the transformation of the OAU to the AU, the centrality of the agenda for collective protection of 
civilians has been echoed in the institutional and normative systems of the African Union, as it has at the global 
stage.36 The institutional aspect has been reflected through the architecture for African Peace and Security. The 
main pillar of this architecture is the Peace and Security Council, provided for by the 2002 Protocol to the AU 
Constitutive Act on Peace and Security (PSC Protocol).37 The normative aspect emphasizes the re-
 
28 A Abass and M Baderin “Towards effective collective security and human rights protection in Africa: An assessment of the Constitutive 
Act of the new African Union” (2002) 49/1 Netherlands International Law Review 1 at 6. 
29 N Mandela, as quoted in R Omaar and A De Waal Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiance (African Rights, 1995) 1138; Dersso above at 
note 26 at 398. 
30 Ambassador S Djinnit, AU Peace and Security Commissioner quoted in K Powell, “The African Union’s Peace and Security Emerging 
Regime: Opportunities and challenges for delivering on the Responsibility to Protect” (ISS Monograph No. 119, 2005); Dersso ibid. 
31 Bellamy above at note 15 at 113. 
32  S/RES/1674 April 28 2006. 
33 Bellamy above at note 15 at 114. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Id at 114, 115. 
36 OAU Sirte Declaration of 9 September 1999; AU Constitutive Act above note 3 at preamble, art 3(h, g), art 4 (o, m, h) and PSC Protocol 
above note 3 at preamble; OAU 37th Summit, Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of the Sirte Summit Decision on the 
African Union, OAU Doc. AHG/Dec. 1 (v) (July 9-11, 2001).  





conceptualization of sovereignty, echoing provisions of the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty (ICISS) framework which conceptualized sovereignty as follows: 
  
…Sovereign states have the primary responsibility for the protection of their people from avoidable catastrophe, 
from mass murder, rape, starvation…but when they are unable or unwilling to do so, the responsibility must be 
borne by the wider community of states.38 
 
This framework reflects Deng’s three pillars, which became a cornerstone of his conceptualization of 
‘sovereignty as responsibility’, as a basis for garnering global consensus on IDPs protection, and eventually 
collective responsibility through R2P.39 For African states, collective responsibility is re-constituted regionally, 
as anticipated under the UN Charter.40 Echoed within the Common African position on R2P (Ezulwini 
Consensus), African states have clarified their commitment to implementing R2P through the AU.41 So far, such 
implementation has prioritized pillar one and two, as well as non-coercive elements of pillar three which are less 
political, over the often-forceful militaristic elements.42 
This development has constituted a drastic turn away from earlier interpretations of principles of 
sovereignty and non-intervention, which had prioritized state security, territorial integrity and political authority 
to the detriment of human security.43 The definition of sovereignty has strongly metamorphosed to reiterate, 
reassert and re-emphasize obligations and duties of individual and collective sovereign states towards the 
protection and upholding of citizens’ and residents’ rights.44 Responsible sovereignty, which is the political and 
intellectual capital of the R2P doctrine, departs from the narrower idea of humanitarian intervention, which is 
state-centred.45 Instead, R2P is victim oriented, it introduces a culture of national and international 
accountability and is a mobilization tool to effect timely reaction to humanitarian crises.46  
In Africa the re-conceptualization of absolute sovereignty is also rooted in the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights.47 Traces of this view can be found in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR) as well as the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) among 
others. 48 Unlike under the OAU Charter, the AU Constitutive Act now reflects in its objectives and principles, a 
strong democratic and human rights content found in the above human rights instruments, where it emphasizes, 
the promotion and protection of human and peoples’ rights and the sanctity of human life, dignity and 
 
38 ICISS Report above at note 14 at 6. 
39 2005 World Summit Outcome Resolution above at note 14 at Para 138, 139; Kuwali above at note 3 at 21; The 2005 World Summit 
outcome resolution also notes the possibilities of the R2P framework for the question of IDPs, and the bolstering of their protection through 
the Guiding principles. 
40 Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI, Chapter VIII article 52(2) and 53 (1).  
41 The Common African Position on the Proposed Reform of the United Nations: The Ezulwini Consensus, Executive Council 7 th  
Extraordinary Session, 7–8 March 2005 Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Ext./EX. CL/2 (VII) 6. 
42 J Iyi “Emerging powers and the operationalisation of R2P in Africa: The role of South Africa in the UNSC” (2014) 7/1 African Journal of 
Legal Studies 149 at 160. 
43 Charter of Organization of African Unity (OAU) adopted on 25 May 1963 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and entered into force on 25 October 
1965, art 3 (para.1, 2, 3 and 5); C Clapham Africa and the International System. The Politics of State Survival (1996, Cambridge University 
Press) at 110-111; D Wemboue, “The OAU and International Law” in Y El Ayouty, The Organization of African Unity After Thirty Years 
(1994, Praeger) 15 at 17; Abbas and Baderin above at note 28 at 9-13. 
44 Deng 2004 above at note 8 at 3. 
45 A Bellamy Responsibility to Protect: The Global Effort to End Mass Atrocities (2009, Polity Press) at 111. 
46 Center for Conflict Resolution (CCR) “Africa’s responsibility to protect” (Policy Advisory Group Seminar Report, 23-24 April 2007 
Somerset West, South Africa) at 7.  
47 B Kioko “The right of intervention under the African Union’s Constitutive Act: From non-interference to non-intervention” (2003) 85 
International Review of the Red Cross (IRRC) 807 at 820; ACHPR above at note 21, art 20 (1); The Charter affirmed the right to equal 
protection of the law, without discrimination (art 3.2, 2), the right to freedom of movement and residence (art 12.1), the right to the respect 
of human dignity, and prohibited all forms of exploitation and degradation of man (art 5). It also affirmed the right to liberty and security 
48 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217 A(III) of 10 December 1948, art 21 (3); and the International Covenant on 





freedom.49 These instruments refer to the will of the people as a basis for government authority and good 
governance.50 This has further made it necessary to re-assert the self-determination doctrine which in effect 
demands respect for people’s sovereign rights over a state’s sovereignty. As Depaigne puts it: 
 
The sovereign is no longer the king, but the nation. Sovereignty is tied to human rights. The sovereign derives its 
legitimacy from the freedom and well-being of its constituent parts, the individuals. This relation is reciprocal, 
human rights legitimize the sovereignty of a nation and, in turn, this sovereignty legitimizes human rights.51 
 
The new institutional framework of the AU requires all its members to observe the above fundamental values 
and standards, in addition to democratic governance and the discouragement of unconstitutional changes of 
government.52 A state that fails to do so may face among others, political and economic sanctions.53 The AU 
Assembly which is the supreme organ54 of the Union is responsible for deciding on intervention through article 
4 (h) of the Constitutive Act. The article sets out a new paradigm of human rights, collective responsibility and 
intervention within the context of peace, security and international justice, specifically in cases involving 
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes (mass atrocities). A co-relating duty is placed upon states to 
request intervention from the Union in order to restore peace and security.55  
The Constitutive Act’s amending Protocol closely mirrors the above norms by empowering the Peace 
and Security Council (PSC) to make recommendations to the AU’s Assembly to intervene where the necessary 
and usual provisions for intervention do not apply, but circumstances require it.56 This has effectively widened 
the ambit of intervention, going beyond mass atrocity crimes, to include  situations that are not classic R2P, but 
where there is a threat to legitimate order or peace and security. The Protocol establishing the PSC reiterates 
these provisions for intervention in its article 7 (e), 4(j) and 4(k).57 These norms are eventually reflected in the 
Kampala Convention which cross-references the intervention right and duty of the AU.58 Cross-reference 
between the AU civilian protection and intervention framework, and the Kampala Convention, strengthens 
arguments for collective responsibility as an implementation tool for IDPs protection regimes. This has created a 
normative, institutional and enforcement system for civilian protection, including what could be considered a 
duty to ensure favorable conditions for finding durable solutions to internal displacement. 
In-depth African conceptualization of responsibility to protect is also seen in the way the AU 
Constitutive Act embraces the three levels of action prescribed by the report of the ICISS. These include 
prevention, reaction and post conflict reconstruction within the three pillars of responsibility; at state level, 
 
49 Article 3 (e) (h) and (g), art 4 (m), (o), (h), and (j) of the AU Constitutive Act;  Deng et al. above at note 9 at 1.  
50 Deng above at note 28 at 4. 
51 V Depaigne “Dis-locating sovereignty? states, self-determination and human rights” (2007) 10 The Bologna Center Journal of 
International Affairs 35 at 37. 
52 Kioko above note 47 at 807. 
53 AU Constitutive Act, art 23 (2).  
54 Id art 6. 
55 Id art 4(j). 
56 Serious threats to legitimate order or restoring peace and security; Kioko above note 47 at 815; Protocol on Amendments to the 
Constitutive Act of the African Union, adopted by the 1st Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of the Union in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on 
3 February 2003 and by the 2nd Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the Union in Maputo, Mozambique on 11 July 2003; Kampala 
Convention above note 3, art 8 (1). 
57 Similar principles are recognized within it as a basis for intervention, including, where the Assembly deems so, in respect of grave 
circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity (as per art 4(h) of the Constitutive Act), or where there is a 
request by a member state in order to restore peace and security, in accordance with Art 4(j) of the Constitutive Act. 
58 Spells out obligations of the African Union, including reiterating its rights to intervene as per art 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act, and the 
obligation to respect a member state’s right to request intervention as a way of contributing to the creation of  favourable conditions for 





through support and capacity building, and finally collective action on inability or unwillingness to act.59 
Pursuant to this, the AU PSC was created in 2004.60 The fifteen-member council supports prevention, 
management and resolution of conflicts on the continent. It functions as a form of collective security and early 
warning system that provides timely and effective responses by the AU to conflict situations.  
The PSC is a source of authority on intervention on the basis of civilian protection against mass 
atrocities, during times of crisis and peace, as an implementer of article 4(h) and 4(j) of the Constitutive Act. 
PSC subsidiary bodies set up to support this task include the Peace Fund, Early Warning System, the Panel of 
the Wise and Africa’s Standby Force. These institutional capacities of the AU’s PSC are collectively the 
foundation for implementing the two dimensions of the responsibility to protect, namely prevention and 
reaction.61 Article 14 of the PSC Protocol outlines the institutional capacity for peace-building, which reflects 
the third R2P dimension of post conflict reconstruction, in line with the AU Policy on Post Conflict 
Reconstruction and Development (PCRD). Under this article, the PSC is empowered to undertake activities 
which include, the resettlement and reintegration of refugees and internally displaced persons, as well as 
providing assistance to vulnerable persons, closely mirroring the role of the UN Peacebuilding commission.62 
The PSC’s role reflects a common understanding that protection, assistance and finding durable solutions to 
displacement, can prevent further displacement and future crises, thus maintaining peace and security.   
 
  
R2P AND THE EVOLVING DISPLACEMENT FRAMEWORK IN AFRICA   
 
The OAU had co-existed with humanitarian crises and forced displacement from its inception.  Consequently, in 
June 1969, the OAU adopted the Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, 
which was anchored in the then exemplary African culture of generosity and solidarity, as a Pan-African 
solution to the refugee crisis on the continent.63 The 1979 Arusha conference and follow-up international 
conferences and high-level meetings on refugees in, and on Africa, reinforced basic humanitarian and solidarity 
principles elaborated in the OAU convention on refugees.64 Since then, the OAU/AU has convened several 
sessions,65 to elaborate these humanitarian and solidarity principles.66 These efforts culminated in the 2009 
Kampala Plan of Action on Forced Displacement in Africa pronounced through the Kampala Declaration.67  
The Declaration became a foundation for the Kampala Convention.68The convention is a landmark 
instrument that has established common regulatory standards for IDPs in Africa by consolidating existing 
 
59 CCR above note 46 at 20.  
60 PSC Protocol above note 3.  
61 CCR above note 46 at 20. 
62 The protocol recognizes the relationship between conflict and forced displacement, provides for the role of the PSC in humanitarian 
coordination and also explicitly acknowledges that conflicts have forced millions of people in Africa, including women and children to flee. 
63 Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, adopted 10 September 
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norms, whilst breaking new ground. It relies heavily on the Guiding principles and reflects them in its preamble, 
whilst regarding them as a legal source of its principles and objectives. It goes beyond them to non-exhaustively 
provide for displacement factors unique to the African context including, harmful practices, unregulated 
development projects and people with special attachment to land.69 Lastly, it clarifies obligations for states, the 
African Union, international and humanitarian organisations, as well as non-state actors, grounding itself on 
state responsibility and the responsibilities of other actors and entities.70  
Elaboration of the right not to be arbitrarily displaced, underscores the novelty of these provisions. By 
broadly and non-exhaustively outlining acts that are deemed a violation of the right, the Convention goes 
beyond delineations of this existing right in international law, to specifically respond to forced displacement in 
Africa. Even though arbitrary displacement is considered a harm rather than a crime under the Convention, acts 
of arbitrary displacement that amount to genocide, war crimes or crimes against humanity are required to be 
declared by states as offenses punishable by law. A corresponding obligation is placed on states to ensure 
responsibility for acts of arbitrary displacement.71 In emphasising IDPs rights, the responsibilities of 
governments and the international community, the right not to be arbitrarily displaced elevates IDPs protection 
from a moral imperative to a legal duty whose violation calls for state accountability. 72 
The obligations the Convention places on relevant actors are in line with the principles underlying R2P, 
starting with obligating member states to protect populations from internal displacement and prevent it.73 It then 
obligates member states as foremost bearers of responsibility for protection and assistance during displacement, 
to ask for support where they are incapable of providing what is required.74This is coupled with placing 
obligations on the AU to: support member states in protection efforts, respond to member states that request 
intervention in accordance with article 4(j), or take bold steps to intervene pursuant to article 4 (h) where the 
states are unwilling to request support, but IDPs needs require it.75 Embedded within these provisions are core 
pillars of R2P, first shouldered by the state, then a duty to support and assist by a collective of African states, 
followed by a collective responsibility to react and intervene where the circumstances call for it in accordance 
with relevant law. The responsibility to reconstruct and rebuild, while not so obvious, can be extrapolated from 
provisions of the convention on durable solutions and compensation.76  
The Africa-wide approach on preventing and addressing internal displacement through collective 
responsibility owes it genesis to initiatives taken within the GLR. The region was indeed, the first in Africa 
where, in the mid-1990s, the UN Security Council invoked Chapter VII powers to authorize humanitarian 
intervention to respond to the internal displacement of persons, refugees and civilians at risk.77  Internal 
displacement within the sub-region has been persistent, protracted, cyclic and a constant consequence of conflict 
and unregulated projects. These realities have led to the sub-region’s responses preceding and influencing the 
AU continental approach. The sub-region is not only one of the parts of the world most affected by the 
phenomenon of IDPs, but it is also one of the few regions which sought to develop a legal and political 
 
69 Kampala Convention above note 3 art 4 (4), 10, 4(5).  
70 Id art 2 (d, e), 3, 4, 5, 6, 7(5), 8 and 9. 
71 Id art 3 (1)(g)(h)(i). 
72 Principle 3, 25 and 27 of the Guiding principles; Id art 3, 4.  
73 Id art 3 and 4.  
74 Id art 5-9.  
75 Id art 8 (1,2,3). 
76 Id art 11 and 12; Clancy above note 22 at 198. 





framework for holistically addressing matters of peace, security and development, including the issue of internal 
displacement.78  
The GLR Pact consists of a set of legal frameworks, programmes of actions, and mechanisms that bear 
amongst other things, collective commitments to integrate economically, but also undertake mutual defence, and 
responsibility to protect within the context of international criminal justice.79 At least ten of the protocols that 
make up the Pact reflect responses to mass atrocities, including R2P trigger factors, which are consequences or 
causes of forced displacement.80 These, and the peace and security elements of the Pact, present a toolbox for 
preventing and addressing mass atrocity for member states of the GLR individually and collectively.81 The GLR 
IDP protocol was the first common sub-regional binding framework in Africa and globally to define roles and 
responsibilities for a wide range of stakeholders operating in displacement settings. Its objective is to establish 
frameworks in which the Guiding principles can be adopted. Together with the GLR Pact, it obligates member 
states to incorporate IDPs Guiding principles into their national legislation as a goal for achieving commonality 
in peace and stability, reconstruction and development.82 The Kampala Convention heavily drew on the Guiding 
principles, but also borrowed from the GLR IDP protocol, taking its provisions a step further. In addition to 
defining who an IDP is, the convention defines the process of internal displacement as  
 
The involuntary, or forced movement, evacuation or relocation of persons or groups of persons within 
internationally recognized State borders.83  
 
Both the Guiding principles and the GLR protocol failed or avoided to define the process of displacement itself. 
Defining the process takes into recognition additional factors such as forced evacuation or relocation, and thus 
easily provides for situations of forced eviction or transfers which are hardly recognized as internal 
displacement triggers, but are prohibited under international humanitarian law.84 Thus, the convention provides 
wider protection in line with international law, and this extends to its recognition of environmental disasters and 
development as displacement factors.85 The IDP protocol incidentally extends on this by definitively including 
development within its definition of IDPs, 86 unlike the Guiding principles, 87 or the Convention.  
The GLR pact has been instructive for the wider Africa process of intervention to protect civilians at 
risk by incorporating special provisions for the forcibly displaced. This has included addressing atrocity crimes 
 
78 UN Security Council Resolution 1291 and 1304 on the establishment of the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR).  
79 International Refugee Rights Initiative (IRRI) Report, In the Interests of Justice? Prospects and Challenges for International Justice in 
Africa. (IRRI, 2008) p. 45 available at: http://www.vrwg.org/downloads/in-the-interests-of-justice.november-2008.pdf accessed on 23-04-
2020. 
80 These are the Protocol on the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons; the Protocol on the Property Rights of Returning 
Persons; the Protocol on the Prevention and Suppression of Sexual Violence Against Women and Children; the Protocol on the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crimes of Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity; the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance; 
the Protocol on Judicial Cooperation; the Protocol on Non-Aggression and Mutual Defence in the Great Lakes Region; the Protocol on 
Management of Information and Communication; the Protocol Against the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources; and the Protocol on 
the Specific Reconstruction Zone.  
81 International Refugee Rights Initiative (IRRI), “Some Reflections on the Legal and Political Mechanisms Bolstering the Responsibility to 
Protect: The African Union and the Great Lakes, Eastern, Southern and Horn of Africa Sub-Regional Arrangements,” 
http://www.refugeerights.org/Publications/2008/R2P%20RECs%20Discussion%20paper.102108.pdf, accessed 2-11-2020. 
82 L Mulamula “Genocide Prevention: Experience of the International Conference on The Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) Regional Forum on 
Genocide Prevention” (3rd -5th March 2010) Arusha, Tanzania, available at 
 http://www.icglr.org/images/LastPDF/GENOCIDE_PREVENTION_Mulamulapaper_2.pdf (accessed on 23-04-2020). 
83 Kampala Convention above note 3 art 1(i). 
84 The Fourth Geneva Convention bans individual or mass forcible transfers in article 49 below; See Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions below at note 113; and art 17 of the Second Geneva Protocol below at note 113. 
85 Kampala Convention  above note 3 art 9 and 10. 
86 GLR IDP Protocol above note 3 art 1; Deng and Cohen above at note 6 at 17. 





like genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, including ethnic cleansing which constitute R2P trigger 
elements, and are displacement causing factors. For instance, in terms of these atrocity crimes, the pact through 
relevant laws, including the Genocide protocol,88 collectively obligates states to refrain from causing, and to 
prevent and punish such crimes, whilst ensuring strict observance of the said undertakings by all national, 
regional and local public authorities and institutions.89 The GLR Protocol on Non-aggression and Mutual 
Defence also provides a legal basis for regional action against non-state armed forces within the region who are 
responsible for committing some of the crimes outlined above, and thus contributing to displacement. These 
frameworks set out regional cooperation platforms to fight negative forces, in recognition of the responsibility to 
protect civilians from serious violations.   
In addition to introducing a protocol to deal with IDPs, the GLR process also introduces a protocol on 
the property rights of returning populations, a protocol on sexual violence and protocols to address some of the 
root causes of flight in the GLR.90 This has worked towards ensuring effective transitional justice processes, 
reinforcing stability, security, setting pace for peacebuilding processes and reconstruction.91 These are important 
for maintaining peace and preventing any future displacements, whilst supporting durable solutions to 
displacement. The process is not perfect, or rather, as a laboratory for international justice, the GLR process is 
not yet perfected. Major setbacks stem from political contestations, that are heightened by racialised, ethnicised 
and sectarian policies of discrimination.  This feeds into, and results from marginalisation and exclusion dating 
back to the colonial project of state building within the region.92  This has paired with the incomplete transition 
to democracy, and state-polarity, reflected strongly in cross border ethnic strife, to create a difficult cycle of 
pockets of instability. This volatility is exacerbated by the  proliferation of small arms, exploitation of abundant 
natural resources and related impunity, which altogether remain a challenge to the successful completion of 
peacebuilding, reconstruction and finding durable solutions to internal displacement.93    
Yet the GLR process also offers great opportunity, if it its core strengths are promoted and appreciated. 
The imperfect early warning mechanism reflected in the follow up institutions of GLR such as the Regional and 
National Committees whose work feeds into each other, can be properly employed to ensure conflict prevention 
and the prevention of atrocity crimes by bolstering proper and rapid response capacities.94 These mechanisms 
can support implementation follow-up of the GLR undertakings, and ensure compliance with peace agreements 
and other legal obligations, reflecting preventive dimensions of R2P.95 So far, the R2P reactive and by extension 
reconstructive dimension, is reflected in the engagement on accountability for international crimes (including 
those resulting in, or arising from forced displacement) within the GLR. This has been a springboard for 
international justice processes, including referrals to the International Criminal Court (ICC), and building 
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national accountability frameworks, for instance, in Uganda and to an extent Kenya.96 The normative and 
ideological space created by the GLR pact’s undertakings has been influenced by, and precipitated continental 
shifts in tackling impunity for international crimes, including the AU normative and institutional systems.  Even 
though a link cannot easily be made, one can recognise the spirit of the pact within the AU Constitutive Act’s 
interventionist stance, the AU Convention on Internal Displacement, the PSC architecture, and the AU 
humanitarian framework.  
The GLR Pact has set forth a path for regionally addressing impunity related to international crimes 
(that in one way or another result in internal displacement). It has been a trailblazer in linking forced 
displacement to international crimes and has embraced the principle of collective responsibility for the 
protection of the most vulnerable civilians, including the displaced.97 For instance, when it comes to the triggers 
of responsibility to protect, its protection ambit is wider than similar norms within the AU Constitutive Act and 
framework. In addition to referring to mass atrocity crimes triggering R2P, it also refers to situations of gross 
violations of human rights, reflecting wider international law protection. This ensures that most situations of 
internal displacement can fall directly within the protection ambit of the GLR framework. This is a significant 
achievement, limited only by the fact the GLR framework does not specify what actions can be collectively 
taken by member states to address such violations when they occur, leaving discretion to an extraordinary 




KENYA AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT IDPS 
 
The IDPs framework and R2P principles in Africa reflect a restatement of existing international norms99 with a 
purpose and intent to highlight states’ responsibility for the protection of vulnerable civilians, including the 
displaced. Acknowledging the relationship between conflict, forced displacement and the viability of peace and 
security, calls for the prescription of responsibility as a means of bolstering implementation of protection for the 
displaced, and accountability for mass atrocities that lead to forced displacement. This emphasis could bolster 
states’ responsibility and collective accountability for IDPs protection in Kenya.100  
Despite criticisms, collaboration between regional and global efforts to halt the 2008 post-election 
violence worked quite well in Kenya, the one place where the UN has arguably discretely and successfully 
exercised the responsibility to protect.101 African regional and sub-regional operationalization of R2P, including 
efforts by the AU PSC’s Panel of the Wise, were key to this. Equally, humanitarian efforts, which cascaded 
from Kenya’s request for assistance within pillar two of R2P, addressed impacts of the crisis on civilians. The 
dimension to rebuild is reflected in peace-building efforts implemented through local and international 
collaboration. Some critics have overlooked these reactive and reconstructive dimensions of R2P, only 
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highlighting the failure to prevent. Others narrowly focus on international elements,102 labelling Kenya a case of 
post-hoc R2P, or concluding that the principle only served as background inspiration.103  
Response strategies based on R2P recognize that regional and sub-regional institutions are important in 
meeting prevention and protection goals. 104 The  possibility of such a partnership between the UN Security 
Council and regional institutions, was contemplated by the UN Charter.105 Settlement of disputes, and or 
enforcement action had been  provided for within subsidiarity settings.106 Thus, addressing internal 
displacement within the African regional and sub-regional framework for advancing peace and security is 
logical. More importantly, paralysis within the UN on decisive and timely responses to mass atrocity crimes, has 
necessitated regional organisations to step in. Their familiarity with frameworks and regional contexts, 
proximity to issues being addressed, and the human rights obligations and international justice apparatus found 
within them, better-place them for operationalizing R2P. 107 
 
 
Characterizing R2P in Kenya  
 
Since independence in 1963, and long before that, Kenya has repeatedly experienced protracted violent internal 
displacement, triggered by politicized ethnic, border and land-related violence as well as banditry, natural 
disasters and development or conservation projects.108 Political violence in particular, or the threat, or 
anticipation of it, has preceded and followed every election since Kenya’s first multi-party elections in 1992.109 
The worst occurred in the aftermath of disputed presidential elections in December 2007.  At the height of this 
post-election violence, more than a 1,113 people were killed and about 600,000 displaced.110 The riots, rape, 
assault murder and forced displacement along ethnic lines, reflected atrocity crimes.111 These crimes can be 
committed in all circumstances, but consist of specified acts, which can occur during widespread, or systematic 
attacks directed against a civilian population. Mass atrocity crimes constitute R2P trigger factors, even though 
they are not the only causes of internal displacement. Conceptually, international law provides a wider ambit for 
displacement relevant R2P than the one reflected in the R2P doctrine.112 This wider ambit reflects protection 
responding to development induced displacement, climate change and socio-economic rights. It also 
encompasses apartheid, the persecution of an identifiable group and even the ‘deportation or forcible transfer of 
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population’, meaning the ‘forced displacement of the persons concerned by expulsion, or other coercive acts 
from the area in which they are lawfully present, without grounds permitted under international law’.113 
Kenya is a member of the AU and the GLR. It has domesticated provisions of the GLR Pact, including 
a legally binding IDP protocol based substantially on the Guiding principles.114 It has also ratified the Kampala 
Convention, even though it is yet to implement it. Thus, in responding to the post-election violence, both 
organisations played an intervention role, though at varying degrees, and within different dimensions. The GLR 
response came from its representative, who initiated the first attempt to pacify the political crisis by 
characterizing what was happening in Kenya as ‘threats of genocide’.115 This reflected the ethnic driven killings, 
displacements and hate campaigns taking place at the time, which would later be echoed in R2P calls by the UN 
Secretary General.116  This statement was issued as the ambassador and the GLR Troika representatives swiftly 
arrived in Nairobi in preparation for wider international initiatives to halt the violence. They simultaneously 
pushed for conflict resolution couched within the confines of the GLR Pact and its Protocols.117 Unlike the AU, 
the GLR did not have an advanced institutional mechanism to engage with the situation. Whilst it is likely that 
its normative framework influenced the post-crisis reconstruction frameworks and accountability approach 
employed, the political settlement came through AU structural efforts.118  After several unsuccessful initial 
negotiation attempts by African leaders, the AU team, led by Kofi Annan and set up within the AU intervention 
framework, successfully took over.119  
The AU Panel of the Wise (Panel) is an organ of the PSC, operating alongside the African Standby 
Force (ASF) and the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS).120 Together these organs of the PSC support 
the AU’s mandate to intervene.121 The Panel was set up to prevent and peacefully resolve conflicts on the 
continent by diplomatically assessing and intervening in situations to prevent further escalation. Together with 
the CEWS, an information gathering facility, the Panel is meant to work as a proactive conflict prevention 
resource. Yet,  the Kenyan response was more reactive than proactive, only inevitably taking place after the 
conflict had escalated. The mandate of the PSC, especially the use of the Panel, could and should have been 
used to prevent the escalation all together. The Panel has been underutilized as a proactive intervention 
mechanism. Its strength lies in its political neutrality and independent modalities which widen its remit for 
preventative diplomacy. If the Panel is supported with more political by-in from wider AU peace and security 
structures, and not limited by political sensitivities, it can be a powerful tool for non-coercive collective 
responsibility within the wider AU intervention framework.122 
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R2P’s reactive dimensions were operationalized through mediation by the Panel, in line with 
intervention provisions of article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act, and article 11 of the PSC Protocol. Its 
mandate was ‘to support efforts of the PSC and those of the Chairperson of the Commission, particularly in the 
area of conflict prevention’.123 Since the conflict had escalated, the mandate also involved preventing further 
escalation and halting the crisis. The mediation was endorsed by the UN, and supported by critical diplomatic 
efforts that encouraged and pressured the feuding parties to mediate, giving momentum to the mediation.124 For 
instance, during the UNSG’s Kenyan visit, he characterized the post-election ethnic clashes in Kenya as an R2P 
situation: 
 
The people and leaders of Kenya, particularly political leaders, have the duty, and the responsibility, to wake up 
and reverse this tragic path before it escalates into the horrors of mass killings and devastation we have witnessed 
in recent history. I have come to emphatically reiterate my fullest support to…Kofi Annan.125 
 
As a politically mediated diplomatic solution, the response fell within the non-coercive dimension of 
responsibility to react, leaving out sanctions or military options, and making UNSC authorization 
unnecessary.126 A peace agreement between the two feuding parties, known as the Kenya National Dialogue and 
Reconciliation (KNDR) Agreement, was signed on 28 February 2008. The settled accord became a basis for a 
shared government and a nation building process, with Mwai Kibaki as President and Raila Odinga as Prime 
Minister. Characterized as covert R2P, with the exception of a statement from the French Foreign Minister,127 
Mr. Annan concluded proudly when it was done  
 
[W]hen we talk of intervention, people think of the military…But under R2P, force is a last resort. Political and 




Agenda 2: Addressing internal displacement as prevention and reconstruction 
 
Kenya had to set up a system to respond internally to the political crisis, ensure that its security institutions and 
criminal justice framework were effective, thus promoting accountability, and then respond to the humanitarian 
crisis, including issues of internal displacement. The National Accord and Reconciliation Agreement.129 was 
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underpinned by the National Accord and Reconciliation Act (2008) (NARA)130 and it identified four critical 
areas for addressing causes of the crisis:  
 
▪Agenda 1: Immediate action to stop violence and restore rights and liberties;  
▪ Agenda 2: Immediate action to address the humanitarian crisis and promote reconciliation;  
▪ Agenda 3: Overcoming the political crisis; and  
▪ Agenda 4: Addressing long term issues, including constitutional and legal reform matters. 
 
The KNDR-led political agreement consequently established three commissions of enquiry to assess the 
electoral process, investigate the violence and promote accountability and reconciliation:  
 
1)  The Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) 
2) The Independent Review Commission on the General Elections (IREC-The Kriegler Commission) 
3) The Commission of Inquiry on Post-Election Violence (CIPEV-The Waki Commission). 
 
Internal displacement was highly recognized within Agenda 2 as a key aspect of the humanitarian crisis and it 
had to be resolved immediately to halt humanitarian suffering and promote reconciliation as a way of preventing 
future conflicts. This aspect closely ties into the peacebuilding and civilian protection agenda of the AU, as well 
as the international justice framework of the GLR process. These frameworks recognize that addressing forced 
displacement, including individual and collective accountability, is an important approach for reconciliation and 
reconstruction, thus preventing future conflicts. The Guiding principles on internal displacement reflect this by 
promoting durable solutions for internal displacement as a means to ensuring peace and stability, above and 
beyond preventing displacement and addressing it. Implementation of agenda 2 was thus aimed at mitigating the 
effects of displacement and ensuring that internal displacement did not become protracted.131 The process of 
building peace in post-conflict or post-crisis, is closely tied to how the situation of displacement within such a 
society is addressed. This emphasizes that in building stable societies, issues of forced displacement must be 
addressed durably, and the internally displaced as well as host communities must be involved in devising 
processes to address such.132 Most importantly, determination of peace processes and peace agreements, cannot 
be complete without engaging with the issue of internal displacement or any other form of displacement, whilst 
ensuring that the communities themselves are at heart of this discussion. The displacement-peacebuilding nexus 
ties in very well with the third dimension of R2P on rebuilding.  
Protection of civilians within this context must reflect finding durable solutions to internal 
displacement, whether as return, local integration or resettlement. Agenda 2 of the KNDR agreement thus 
prioritized dealing with the displacement crisis by mandating an investigation into the post-election violence 
that caused mass displacement. CIPEV was to investigate the facts and surrounding circumstances related to the 
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violence that followed the elections and make recommendations to the TJRC to prevent any recurrence of the 
violence in future, including issues of displacement. In the process, IDPs legal and policy frameworks were 
adopted, and criminal justice accountability for those who were involved in instigating crimes was 
recommended. The latter would lead to an ICC referral and precede what would become an international 
criminal justice option within the R2P toolkit.133 Both the IDPs and accountability systems emanated from the 
GLR process and its frameworks, emphasising its normative and conceptual contribution to rebuilding Kenya. 
The CIPEV report highlighted that finding durable solutions for internal displacement was key for 
achieving peace and addressing the humanitarian crisis. Prioritising IDPs needs and rights (protection) and 
providing proper support for return, re-integration and resettlement was important. CIPEV considered IDPs as 
the human face to the consequences of post-election violence, and the resolution of their plight would be a 
measure and indication of the government’s response to the post-election violence as part of its state 
responsibility. Accordingly, a team was put together to forge a National Reconciliation and Emergency Social 
and Economic Recovery Strategy.134 As part of the strategy, and in line with the KNDR settlement agreement, 
government undertook to provide protection, security and encourage local integration, return or resettlement and 
rehabilitation of IDPs. It would also provide basic services for those in camps, provide information, including 
ensuring close linkages and work with national and international assistance to enhance effective response, 
national dialogue and reconciliation.135  
Return was obviously more prioritized than other solutions because it was easier, quicker and cheaper. 
However, this political enthusiasm did not translate into effective processes, in fact the way return was 
implemented left a lot to be desired. The operation was from the beginning marred by haste, coercion, 
inefficiency, nepotism, corruption and lack of consideration or even consultation with the affected populations 
going against legal requirements.136 To this end, the return process failed the durability test, seeing that most 
IDPs eventually got re-displaced upon return, or did not effectively benefit from return packages. This coupled 
with unresolved and outstanding land, property and security issues forced them to eventually settle within the 
urban poor.137 Due to this, the question of preventing future displacement remains open. Perhaps clearly 
situating the response within the KNDR settlement agreement would have elevated the R2P spirit underlying the 
agreement and emphasized effective prevention, protection and accountable rebuilding, including return, thus 
lending credence to the process. When one weighs this part of the Kenyan response against the R2P framework, 
it fails miserably.  
Responsibility to protect emphasizes a dimension to prevent crisis. Within the context of internal 
displacement that reflects identifying and preventing trigger factors that lead to displacement. The future of 
protecting the most vulnerable during crisis is most dependent on the capacity of the state to identify and 
prevent or halt possible atrocity crimes. For this matter, national bodies have been set up to provide early 
warning support within the GLR. These bodies reflect the GLR regional follow up mechanisms, specifically the 
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Regional committees, and their parallel national committees that are provided for by the GLR Genocide 
Protocol.138 The Kenyan National Committee for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, War 
Crimes, Crimes Against Humanity and All Forms of Discrimination (National Committee) was launched in 
2012 and is situated within the Ministry of foreign affairs as part of the function of the Office of the Great 
Lakes.139 Potential for the committee playing a strong part in early warning or prevention lies in its composition 
of different players from civil society, academia, government ministries and local or religious leadership. These 
groups of people have access to, and engage with issues on the ground and within communities. They are well 
privileged to sensitize communities, analyze new and emerging threats and influence the process of prevention 
by feeding back into the national and GLR regional early warning framework on atrocity prevention. 140  
However most of these national committees are yet to be fully capacitated, in Kenya, the National 
Committee has not taken off properly since 2012. There is also limited information on who does what and 
when. Proper training on the UN Atrocity crimes framework needs to be constantly implemented and these 
committees need to be capacitated technically and financially to carry out their roles. Most importantly, it is not 
clear whether their expertise and context is properly tapped into when circumstances require it. For instance, 
there is no obvious link between the work that the GLR National Committee does and the work done by 
institutions set up by the KNDR agreement on addressing the post-election violence and preventing any future 
crisis that would result in displacement.141 Given that most members of the National Committee are drawn from 
institutions and ministries set up under the KNDR agreement, the link should be automatically obvious.142 Yet, 
besides the IDP Act and policy, it remains difficult to directly link the early warning and legal protection system 
emanating from the GLR process to efforts and mechanisms set up in Kenya for collectively resolving the crisis 
and consequent displacement.143 The AU system was more visible in resolving the crisis, but its institutional 
system is not streamlined locally, for instance the CEWS has not influenced early warning in Kenya, equally, 
reconstruction through article 14 of PSC was not explored. This mix match in normative and institutional 
options, has left operationalization, applicability and implementation gaps in collectively protecting the 
internally displaced.  
The Kenyan experience presents difficulties associated with attempt to reconcile R2P with IDPs 
protection. Kenya inadequately provided an illustration of what R2P can deliver in situations of internal 
displacement.  Unfortunately, that intervention avoided linking the response structure to Guiding principles, the 
GLR framework, the AU framework or express R2P. This limited any future option for easily relying on it 
within these contexts. In fact, the Guiding principles and internal displacement only indirectly find a place 
within the CIPEV report and recommendations therein, with the KNDR settlement agreement skirting around, 
and lumping IDPs within other humanitarian issues. Because of this, linking IDPs issues to R2P principles 
underlying the peace agreement proves to be even more difficult, and this limits any attempts to collectively 
obligate Kenya to protect IDPs within this context. These factors make it difficult to replicate the Kenyan 
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approach in circumstances that are different from those in Kenya. It becomes very clear that ‘the power of R2P 
is political, not legal.’144 R2P has been instrumental in opening up the necessary political space to spell out 
procedures, and thereby also begin to open up new possibilities, for collective international action, which in 
exceptional circumstances, situations of internal displacement may demand. But as we saw in Kenya, avoiding a 
legal-oriented approach, becomes an easier less messy political option for obtaining international support, and 
limits the outcomes of R2P for IDPs to humanitarian assistance as opposed to legal protection, which would 
have been a state obligation, failure of which collective action is justified. This also means R2P within 
displacement situations will only work where and when it is politically viable.  
 
 
CONCLUSION   
 
The reality of  internal displacement in Africa, and the human rights violations that accompany it and cause it, 
require response capabilities that find preserve in collective accountability underlined within R2P. The in-state 
nature of internal displacement, the fact that basic responsibility for protecting the internally displaced rests with 
states within which the IDPs find themselves, and the often times broken relationship, or incapacity to protect 
that leads to, or results from such displacement, has unlocked opportunities leading to the call for the 
reconceptualization of sovereignty itself.  
International human rights and humanitarian law already reflects the criminalisation and prohibition of 
forced displacement. This includes, the protection of specific categories of the vulnerable from evictions that are 
prohibited under international law, recognition that all human beings are protected under human rights law, 
including IDPs, and finally, obligating states to take responsibility for consequences of internal displacement 
and enjoyment of other entitlements. By reflecting these provisions, as compiled within the Guiding principles, 
and being guided by them, both the AU and GLR framework were influencing, but also being influenced by 
norms already in existence. Perhaps what they offer, is a more concise, codified, collectively binding and 
elaborated version of these norms, specified to the African context.145 
Yet, IDPs protection couched within R2P is still theoretical and rare in Africa.146 This could be because 
of its limited and narrow application to atrocity crimes.  The side-lining of the Guiding principles in R2P 
contexts and the exclusion of disaster IDPs is also problematic, but politically expedient because it limits 
situations within which R2P can be invoked.147 The most contentious aspect here is the dichotomy between 
human rights and humanitarian oriented protection of IDPs. R2P re-emphasises the politics of demanding IDPs 
protection from the state and threats of collective intervention, as opposed to the easier and less political, 
humanitarian assistance.  This is compounded by the fact that R2P is often reduced to military intervention. The 
obvious limited confidence in, and tensions brought on by military action, and the fact that non-coercive 
elements of R2P remain ignored, has contributed to the norm having limited relevance in IDPs situations.148 
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This disregards the fact that all R2P pillars and dimensions are essential, and can be implemented together or 
separately within the context of internal displacement. 
The politicization of the approach, and the lack of clarity of the concept itself has opened it for 
criticism, but therein lies opportunity to elaborate it to work for the IDPs context. Besides, in Africa, the concept 
is not vague because it is clarified and reflected in legal framework, both at sub-regional and regional level, 
creating legal obligations. Most skepticism surround African peace-keeping and intervention forces and it is 
argued that collective military action by these efforts is limited both by resources and capacity.149 Yet this 
should not be an issue if Africa prioritizes pillar one, two and non-coercive elements of pillar three, like it has so 
far. This could go hand in hand, with Africa building its intervention force. Perhaps, the biggest issue remains 
the residual sovereignty which can obstruct future attempts to promote collective action, limiting it to just lip 
service, but as we have seen in Kenya, where non-coercive aspects are operationalized, intervention works 
well.150 Notably, operationalizing R2P regionally, might be more effective, and less politicized, due to 
familiarity with actors and frameworks. It also presents less suspicion and is more amenable to regional 
diplomatic realities.  
Of note is the Kenyan scenario where despite obvious challenges, R2P was ‘successfully’ implemented 
because from the on-set Kenya accepted regional and international support in the form of mediation and did not 
raise the sovereignty cloak. More importantly, because the intervention set out in Kenya reflected dialogic (non-
coercive) elements of R2P, this limited politicization of the issue and the UNSG easily bypassed UNSC 
authorization as required by article VII of UN Charter.151 Additionally, the intervention happened within the 
context of the regionally championed AU security apparatus (the Panel), with only support from the United 
Nations. This regionalised form of intervention, perhaps lent credence to the mediators, who were mostly 
African current or former leaders and limited distrust usually levelled against international interventions.  
  R2P can only succeed in bolstering the implementation of IDPs protection frameworks if there is 
political will for states to subject themselves to collective accountability. Mere existence of legal, policy and 
institutional capabilities does not in itself guarantee adherence to such standards.152  For instance, in Kenya, 
internal demand for peace, and political willingness to settle, worked better than an imposed external solution 
would have. Importantly, African initiatives to bolster IDPs protection must reconcile their approach to 
operationalizing R2P with the cleavages that exist within Africa’s political, institutional and normative 
compliance mechanisms.  Weak responses on the ground and the very theoretical reality of intervention to 
protect IDPs, requires more preventative than reactive solutions. This can be achieved by prioritizing prevention 
of conflict, building stronger early warning mechanisms, promotion of transparency, facilitation of democratic 
governance and building political and legal consensus on relevant intervention measures where national 
governments have failed or are unable to perform accordingly.153 Such measures need not be only militaristic 
and coercive. Perhaps it is important to engage with non-coercive approaches as displayed in Kenya. Such 
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